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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

I

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
VS.

JOSEPH GENE CARTER,
(
Defendant-Appellant. '

Case No.

12467

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Joseph Gene Carter, appeals from the
conviction of second degree burglary in violation of Utah
Code Ann. ~ 76-9-3 ( 1953) ente1·ed against him following
trial by jury in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Maurice Harding, Judge, presiding.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty of second degree burglary
by a jury, as charged in the information and was sentenced
to an indeterminate term provided by law to the Utah
State Prison.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent asks this Court to affirm the judgrner
of the district court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State adopts the appellant's statement of fact
except as hereinafter set forth.
The State first called Francis S. Lundell who testifa
that about December 2nd or 3rd, 1970, he left to visithl
sister in California and when he returned on DecemberZ!
1970, he obferved that his horne had been burglariz~
Entrance had been gained by breaking through the bacl
door of his home. Among the items stolen were: a shot
gun, rifle, Elgin watch, wallet, television, radio, diamom
rings, cuff links, another wallet, china, electric can opene:
spotlight, binoculars, outboard motors, electric drilli
socket sets, and hydraulic jacks. Mr. Lundell also testifia
that every room roorn of his house had been ransacka
as well as his outdoor sheds, and someone had attempta
to pry open the door of his camper (T. 7-10). The onl!
items recovered from this burglary were the shotgun, rillt
watch an.d wallet (T. 9).
Mr. Lundell testified that he did not know the d~
fendant, Joseph Gene Carter, and he had never authoriz~
hirn to enter his home or to take any of the stolen itelll
(T. 10). On cross-examination the defense brought o~
the belief of Mr. Lundell that more than one person woul1
have been involved in the burglary to have loaded ili
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electric motors and he furtner testified that there were
different sized shoe tracks in the snow (T. 12-13).
Ruth Bethers tec;tified that she was engaged to Larry
Carter, a brnther of the defendant (T. 21), and that E:he
personally knew Joe Carter (T. 13). Mrs. Bethers testified that on December 2, 1970, the defendant, Joe Carter,
another brother, Larry Carter and Ike McDonald came to
her house at about noon. Ike McDonald had two wallets
with him and was removing cards from them. Mrs. Bethers
was unable to identify plaintiff's Exhibit 4 as one of the
wallets, but she did remember one of the wallets was black
(T.14). While Mrs. Bethers was unable to identify the
defendant, Joe Carter, as having made any incriminating
statements, she did testifiy that her fiance, Larry Carter,
"kept telling them they were crazy." (T. 15).
At 5: 45 p.m. the same day, Mrs. Bethers testified that
the defendant, Joseph Carter, Danny Carter and Ike
McDonald came to her home and her fiance, Larry Carter,
t.old Mrs. Bethers he "didn't want to go with them, but
he had to talk them out of it." The four of them then left.
At about 6: 30 p.m., the defendant, Danny Carter, Larry
C11rter and Ike McDonald returned to her home (T. 1617). When they returned, they had a rifle which Larry
brought into the house. Mrs. Bethers identified plaintiff's Exhibit 2 as the rifle brought into her home (T. 18).
Mrs. Bethers also testified the next day, just before noon,
the defendant and Danny Carter, Ike McDonald and two
others arrived and stopped in front of her home. At that
time, Larry Carter got the rifle and tool;: it out to the car

4
and moments later Archie Thompson pulled up beblm
them. The next thing she observed was Thompson putt~
the gun into his car (T. 19). Mrs. Bethers assisted t~
sheriff in getting this rifle back from Thompson (T. 20)
The next prosecution witness was Bill Bethers wh
testified that he was in the home of his ex-wife, Rutl
Bethers, on December 21, 1970. Joe Carter, the defendan1
and Danny Carter and Ike McDonald were there present
Ike McDonald had a black wallet and Bethers saw a busi
ness card that had the name Lundell on it (Tr. 23-24)
The next witness, William Albert Carter, testified tha1
on December 22, 1970, he was riding in a car driven b1
Danny Carter (T. 26). The defendant, Joe Carter, aJI(
possibly someone else, perhaps Ike McDonald, were ala
in the car (T. 26). Danny Carter gave the witness a wat.cl
to hock, and this watch given him was identified as plain
tiff's Exhibit 3 (T. 25), which was stolen from Franci
Lundell's home (T. 9). William Albert Carter testifi01
that there were conversations concerning a house the:
had broken into and about a couple of items stolen b:
them, including a drill and hydraulic jacks. At this tilllf
they drove to the home that had been buglarized to Iool
for Danny's driver's license, which had been used to opet
the front door (T. 28-29). The home was described~
being "out by Payson" and it had a "truck and boat ani
some shacks out back." (T. 29). His testimony reveal~
that Danny Carter had the wallet identified as plaintff:
Exhibit 4 in his possession (T. 29), and also the watd
identified as plaintiff's Exhibit 3.
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William Albeit Carter te3tified that Danny's driver's
license was found at the burglarized home after returning
a second time to look for it (T. 31), and that he later
found out the home in question was Mr. Lundell's (T. 32).
The witness also testified on cross-examination that while
looking for the driver's license they picked up an electric
drill at the home; Joe Carter, the defendant, Ylas present
at the time of this theft (T. 36).
The final prosecution witness was Utah County
Deputy Sheriff, Mack Holley. He testified that Joe Carter, the defendant, was in the Utah County Jail on January 11, 1971 (T. 39). At about 1: 00 p.m., Deputy Holley
gave Joe Carter his Miranda rights and then asked him
"if he had been a part of the burglary at Francis Lundell's
place." Joe Carter said, "No" and "didn't want to answer
any more questions at that time." (T. 40). Deputy Holley
then ceased all questioning. Approximately three hours
later that day, after Joe Carter had been taken out of his
cell and had been visiting with his wife, Deputy Holley
asked the defendant if he had told his wife the truth and
asked the jailor to bring Larry Carter and Danny Carter
out of their cell so Joe could tell them all that he "didn't
do it." After Danny told him "you just as well tell him
the truth," Joe admitted he had been a part of the burglary (T. 41). None of this testimony was objected to by
the defense.
The prosecution rested and the defense moved to dismiss on the grounds of insufficient evidence. This motion
was denied (T. 50).

..
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The defense called Paddie M. Carter, the wife of fu
defendant, to testify as a witness. She gave a somewD.
different account of the date and circumstances leaclinga
to the admissions of her husband. She testified the dat
was January 7, 1971, not January 11, and that Deput
Holley asked a couple of questions as to whether Joew~
telling the truth (TT. 51-52). The defendant's wife the
testified that both she and the defendant agreed to ha1
Danny and Larry brought out and to have Joe tell il
story in front of them. She differs on what was then sair
claiming that Deputy Holley asked several questions~
fore Danny and Larry spoke telling Joe, "Go on, Joe,~
them. They have got us all." Mrs. Carter testified thatJ~
then said, "I was there." (T. 53).
Following this testimony the defense rested. The cour
read the instructions to the jurors and closing argumenl
were presented. The jury retired to deliberate at 3:0
p.m., and returned at 3: 33 p.m. (T. 56) and returned:
guilty verdict (T. 57) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TESTIMONY OF THE STATE'S WITNE&
DEPUTY SHERIFF MACK HOLLEY, WAS ADMISSIBLl
UNDER THE MIRANDA DOCTRINE, AND NO ERROf
WAS MADE IN ITS ADMISSSION. FURTHER, THE FAil
URE TO OBJECT TO ITS ADMISSION WAIVES AN1
RIGHT OF THE DEFENDANT TO APPEAL THIS ISSU!
A.

FAILURE TO OBJECT.

1

1
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The defense never objected or excepted to the testimony of Deputy Sheriff, Mack Holley, at any stage of
the proceeding. Since the defense was aware that Deputy
Holley would likely testify, they should have moved to
suppress any allegedly illegally obtained confession and
failure to so move or to object at trial must be deemed to
be a knowing waiver.
The defendant, Joseph Gene Carter, was arraigned
in the City Court of Provo City, County of Utah, State
of Utah, on a charge of second degree burglary on Janu-

ary 8, 1971. The City Court at this date appointed Robert
Sumsion to represent the defendant (R. 3), and the defendant was advised of his right to a preliminary hearing
(R. 5) at this time. On January 22, 1971, the defendant
and his attorney were present in court for the defendant's
preliminary hearing. Among the witnesses for the State
was Deputy Sheriff Mack Holley who was sworn and
testified for the State (R. 3). Following the preliminary
hearing, the City Court bound the defendant over for
trial (R. 8). On January 29, 1971, the defendant with
counsel appeared in the Fourth Judicial District Court
and entered a plea of not guilty. The court set trial for
February 9, 1971 (R. 11). The matter came on for trial
and at no time before or during trial is there any indication
that the defendant objected to or moved to suppress the
testimony of Deputy Sheriff Mack Holley. Since Deputy
Holley testified at preliminary hearing, it was apparent
that his testimony would deal with the confession of the
defendant. Utah law recognizes that the defense must

8
move to suppress evidence at the earliest possible fu
so as to give the trial court an opportunity to fairly evalr
ate the voluntariness of the confession. State u. Tuttle,!
U.2d 288, 399 P.2d 580 (1965), cert. denied 382 US 81.
(1965).

It is generally conceded that the trial court is un~
no affirmative duty to inquire into the validity of a con
fession or admission unless the defendant objects to if
admissibility. See Lundberg u. Buckhoe, 389 F.2d 154 (61
Cir. 1968); Hammonds u. State, 442 P.2d 39 (Alasl
1968); State u. Davis, 157 N.W.2d 907 (Iowa 1968); Stai·.
u. Gray, 432 S.W. 2d 593 (Mo. 1968); State u. Oliva, lo
N.W.2d 112 (Neb. cert. denied 395 U.S. 925.
N.W. 2d 112 (Neb. 1968), cert. denied 395 U.S. 9~
(1969).

In a case similar to this, the Supreme Court of Alas& '
decided that when at trial, counsel deliberately fails !1
object to the introduction of evidence obtained contrar:
to the Miranda doctrine, such a bypass precludes th
defendant from asserting his constitutional claim on ap
peal.
". . . In these circumstances we believe tblr
it is reasonably apparent that appellant's cound
knew of the requirement of Miranda, but chosefu
allow appellant's statements to be admitted wh~
counsel knew that he could have prevented thet
admission by objecting. This suggests that coun.ot
deliberately by-passed the opportunity to keep ~1
exculpatory statement out of evidence as a part
of trial strategy, whatever it may have been. Theli
is a clear intimation of a deliberate design to kno~·

~
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ingly forego a constitutional claim. Such a deliberate act on the part of counsel amounts to a waiver
of appellant's right which is binding on appellant.
[United States v. Armetta, 378 F.2d 658, 661 (2d
Cir. 1967). Further citations omitted.] We do not
know of the existence of any 'exceptional circumstances' which, if present, could mean that appellant would not be precluded by his counsel's action
from asserting his constitutional claim." [See
Henry v. State of Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451-452
(1965)] (Footnotes omitted). Hammonds v.
State, supra, at 42-43.

Since there was no objection at trial to the admission
of Deputy Holley's testimony the defendant would be
IQ
precluded from raising that issue for the first time on
appeal. Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 U.2d 19, 465 P.2d 343
I~
(1970). But the Utah Court has recognized that even in
the absence of a proper objection the Court may review
;& claimed errors if it appears that the interests of justice
!1
so require. State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936);
ii: State v. Shad, 24 U.2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970). However,
~ in this case, no interests of justice would require the
ap Court to review this claimed error where the defense deliberately chose not to object to the introduction of the
evidence, but rather, chose to attack on cross-examination
]JI
d the memory and perception of the witness. See (T. 42-48).
ai·.
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B. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF FIFTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS.

The United States Supreme Court in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) briefly stated its holding
at p. 444 as follows:

10

". . . [T]he prosecution may not use sta11 J
m~nts, whether eRculpatory or inculpatory, sterr

nung from custodial interrogation of the defendan:
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural saJ1 r
?"ua~ds_ eff~ctive to secure the privilege aga.inst 1~
mcrumnation. By custodial interrogation we mEJ:
questioning initiated by law enforcement officer.
after a person has been taken into custody n
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in an '
significant way. As for the procedural safeguaru
to be employed, unless other fully effective mean
are devised to inform accused persons of their rig~
of silence and to assure a continuous opportunit
to exercise it, the following measures are requir~ 1
Prior to any questioning, the person must h ,
warned that he has a right to remain silent, thl
any statement he does make may be used 1
evidence against him, and that he has a right t
the presence of an attorney, either retained t
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuati[
of these rights, provided the waiver is made volun
tarily, knowingly, and intelligently. If, howew
he indicates in any manner and at any stage oftfr
process that he wishes to consult with an attomr
before speaking there can be no questioning. Likf
wise, if the individual is alone and indicates in all·
manner that he does not wish to be interrogate:
the police may not question him. The m~re far
that he may have answered some questions n
volunteered some statements on his own does~
deprive him of the right to refrain from answe~
any further inquiries until he has consulted Wl~
an attorney and thereafter consents to be que
tioned." (Footnotes omitted.)
Carter seeks to have his conviction reversed u~
the grounds that, inter alia, he did not receive an adequat

11

t

1

Mirarula warning, and that after he indicated he wished
to have questioning ceased, the police obtained the admission. The record clearly shows that Carter received
an adequate Miranda warning (T. 40). As to the contention that the admission was received contrary to Miranda,
it is important to note the purpose and intent of the
Miranda doctrine.

Miranda was aimed at the evil of incommunicado intenogation, and the purpose of the Miranda warnings
is to dispel the coercion inherent in police custodial surroundings which result in self-incriminating statements
being given without full warnings of constitutional rights.
See Miranda, supra, at 445. see also People u. Smith, 475
P.2d 627 (Colo. 1970).
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The circumstances in which Carter made his admission contained none of the evils Miranda attempted to
meet.
Carter had been arrested and was placed in jail.
Deputy Sheriff Mack Holley testified that he advised
Carter of his Miranda rights and then asked him if he
had been a part of the burglary at Francis Lundell's place.
Carter answered, "No," and he said he did not want to
answer any more questions at that time (T. 39-40). A
couple of hours later after Carter had been visiting with
his wife and was out of his cell, Deputy Holley asked him
if he had told his wife the truth. He replied that he had.
Deputy Holley then got the jailor to get Larry Carter
and Danny Carter out of their cell. Deputy Holley in the
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presence of Carter's wife and Danny and Larry C~
then said:
"Okay, Joe, I want you to tell these guys tfu
you didn't do it."
Deputy Holley's trial testimony then continued,
"So we got them all there together and I sait
'Now! did you do it?' And Danny Carter said, 'J~
you Just as well tell him the truth, because n
knows about it. He has been able to get someu
the items that were taken.'"
"And at this point Joe said, 'Okay, okay. ha
a part of it. I was a part of the burglary.' " (T. 41
Under these facts it is clear that the evil of incorr
municado interrogation was not present when Carter ai
mitted he was part of the burglary and it is equally clea
that Carter was told prior to his admission of his right!
remain silent. (Once a party is told of his right to remai
silent there is no requirement that he be advised each tim
he is questioned. See State u. Brooks, 107 Ariz. 318, ~
P.2d 385 (1971). Thus, the evils Miranda was meant\
dispel were not present when Carter admitted his corr
plicity in the crime. So even if the Court could revie:
the claimed error there is no reason to overturn the jury
verdict.
Further, since the trial court admitted the question~
testimony, it must be presumed that the trial court foun
the admission to have been voluntarily given, State
Mares, 113 Utah 225, 192 P.2d 861 (1948). The defendan!
Carter, has failed to show any involuntariness, or coropi

1
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sion which would make his admission inadmissible. In
addition, the testimony of the defense's witness, Paddie
Carter, indicates that the defendant consented to have
Danny and Larry Carter present when the defendant told
his story. Thus, by the defense's own witness, the defendant aclmowledges that he voluntarily consented t.o speak
(T. 52). Since the defendant consented to give statements
he is deemed to have waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and thus, no Miranda violation could occur. State v. Hughes, 104 Ariz. 535, 456 P.2d
393 (1969).
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT WAS ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED AT TRIAL AND HIS CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL MUST BE REJECTED.

The standard generally announced to judge whether
a convicted felon was denied effective assistance of counsel is whether assistance was so ineffective that it reduced
the trial to a sham or farce. See State v. Bustamante, 103
Ariz. 551, 447 P.2d 243 (1968) and People v. Aikens, 74
Cal. Rptr. 882, 450 P.2d 258 (1969).
In Alires v. Turner, 22 U.2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969),
the Court stated:
"The requirement [of assistance of counsel] is
not satisfied by a sham or pretense of an appearance in the record by an attorney who manifests
no real concern about the interests of the accused.
The entitlement is to the assistance of a competent
member of the Bar, who shows a willingness to

14
identify himself with the interests of the defendar
and present such defenses as are available to hl
under the law and consistent with the ethics oft'
profession." Id. at 243.
l

This "tamlard vms easily met. The record demo:
strates that the defendant v;J.s ad2q_uately represented!
an attorney of good standing; the mere fact that the~
pellate counsel disagrees with the tactics of trial COUil\
is of no concern to this Court and is no ground for holdin
ineffective assist:mce of coumel. See State v. Lopez,'.
U.2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 (1969).
POINT III

THERE IS NO REQUH1EMENT THAT CLOSING A!
GUMENTS OF COUNSEL BE REPORTED AND IN TR
ABSENCE OF A SPECIFIC REQUEST AT TRIAL W
SUCH REPORTING, THE DEFENDANT MAY NOT CLAJl
ERROR ON APPEAL.

There was no request made at trial that the clos[
arguments of counsel be recorded. It is generally recq
nized that it is the responsibility of the defense attorn1
to request that closing arguments be recorded. In PiW
State, 4-31 P.2d 449 (Oki. Cr. 1967), the Court states:

"It has long been the rule that defense coWL'
has the responsibility to request, and such requ~
must be made of the court reporter at each ITT
when he desires to have the closing argument.n
pcrted. It is defense counsel's pole responsib~
. own record , . . ·"
to preserve and protect h 1s
The defendant does not allegate that any error\\'.
committed in the closing argument, he only states thatn
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the arguments been :L'ecorde<l he might have discovered
some error or have been able to demonstrate that the trial
counsel was ineffective. Such hypothetical assumptions of
possible error furnish no ground for relief. Where the defendant failed to request the reporting of closing arguments and where he has failed to make it affirmatively
appear that any of his substantial rights were in any way
prejudiced by such proceedings not being recorded, he is
entitled to no relief. State v. Brown, 198 Kan. 473, 426
P.2d 129 (1967).
POINT IV
NO ERROR WAS CO:MMITTED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN ALLOWING
THE TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM ALBERT CARTER OR IN
DIRECTING THE ,JURY TO REGARD CERTAIN STIPULATIONS TO BE TRUE.

After the prosecution had presented their case, the
defense moved for a dismissal of the charge on the grounds
that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the necessary allegations to make out a charge of burglary (T. 50).
'I'he motion was denied.
There was no error in denying this motion. The defense based this motion upon their view that the State had
failed to produce evidence showing Carter was a part of
the burglary. But since the evidence must be viewed in
the light most consistent with the jury's verdict, it is clear
that the state met their burden of proof. State v. Seymour,
18 U.2d 153, 417 P.2d 655 (1966).
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The defense also objected to the testimony of fr
State's witness William Albert Carter on the basis tk
his testimony did not state which persons made the r
criminatory statements. The witnesses did testify thatfr
defendant was riding around in the ca.I and the defendar
was in the presence of persons who made the incriminafa
statements that they had burglarized a home. Whiletl
witness, William Albert Carter, was unable to specifict
state which persons made which sta~ements he did st1;
that the defendant was present when they (meaningtl
defendant, Danny Carter, himself, and possibly Ike 11:
Donald) returned to the burglarized home to get ti
driver's license of Danny Carter previously left at tl
scene and while there present they picked up an electr
drill (T. 35-37). This evidence was relevant and mater~
to the question of the defendant's presence at the seer
of the crime and was properly admitted.
The objection of the defendant to the stipulatio:
(T. 48-48) is also without merit. The stipulations co:
cemed matters dealing with the procuring of evidence Ir
trial and did not involve any of the elements to prove tl
defendant's guilt. The fact that the judge instructed il
jury to consider the stipulations to be true does not comr
a finding of error, and even if there may have been em
no prejudice could have resulted from the instructio'
Since the matters stipulated to were uncontested, H
jury would have had to have found them to be true, e11
if not so instructed. See State v. Chavez, 78 N.M. 446,4
P.2d 411 (1967), People v. Wood, 75 C.A. 2d 246, 170P:
477 (1946).

17
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CONCLUSION

:all

The State respectfully submits that the lower court's
decision should b2 affirmed. Carter was given a fair and
impartial trial before a jury. The transcript discloses no
errors of law requiring a reversal of the verdict. Therefore,
respondent respectfully submits that the jury verdict and
conviction in the district court should be affirmed.
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